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Abstract
During social interactions, decision-making involves mutual reciprocity—each individual's
choices are simultaneously a consequence of, and antecedent to those of their interaction part-
ner. Neuroeconomic research has begun to unveil the brain networks underpinning social
decision-making, but we know little about the patterns of neural connectivity within them that
give rise to reciprocal choices. To investigate this, the present study measured the behaviour
and brain function of pairs of individuals (N = 66) whilst they played multiple rounds of eco-
nomic exchange comprising an iterated ultimatum game. During these exchanges, both players
could attempt to maximise their overall monetary gain by reciprocating their opponent's prior
behaviour—they could promote generosity by rewarding it, and/or discourage unfair play
through retaliation. By adapting a model of reciprocity from experimental economics, we show
that players' choices on each exchange are captured accurately by estimating their expected
utility (EU) as a reciprocal reaction to their opponent's prior behaviour. We then demonstrate
neural responses that map onto these reciprocal choices in two brain regions implicated in social
decision-making: right anterior insula (AI) and anterior/anterior-mid cingulate cortex (aMCC).
Finally, with behavioural Dynamic Causal Modelling, we identified player-specific patterns of
effective connectivity between these brain regions with which we estimated each player's
choices with over 70% accuracy; namely, bidirectional connections between AI and aMCC
that are modulated differentially by estimates of EU from our reciprocity model. This input-
state-output modelling procedure therefore reveals systematic brain–behaviour relationships
associated with the reciprocal choices characterising interactive social decision-making.
KEYWORDS
anterior insula, anterior (mid-)cingulate cortex, behavioural Dynamic Causal Modelling,
connectivity, iterated ultimatum game, reciprocity, social decision-making
1 | INTRODUCTION
Decision-making during repeated social interactions involves a dynamic
process of mutual reciprocity, whereby the choices we make are simul-
taneously a cause and an effect of our interaction partners' behaviour.
Over the course of a repeated dyadic exchange, for example, each inter-
actant will reward or punish their partner's prior behaviour in an attempt
to promote or discourage certain future behaviours. Neuroeconomic
research has begun to elucidate the brain networks underpinning social
decision-making during interactive contexts (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011), yet
it remains unknown how patterns of neural connectivity within these
networks give rise to reciprocal choices (e.g., Cáceda et al., 2017).
The ultimatum game (UG; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze,
1982) presents an experimental paradigm with which to investigate
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reciprocity during social interaction (see Krueger, Grafman, & McCabe,
2008). In this game, a Proposer is asked to divide a sum of money (the
‘pie’) between themselves and a Responder, who then chooses
whether to accept or reject the proposed division. If the Responder
accepts then the pie is divided accordingly, but if they reject, neither
player receives any payoff. When played in a typical one-shot format,
whereby the game ends after the Responder accepts or rejects a sin-
gle proposal, modal offers are around 40% of the pie. This is believed
to reflect strategic behaviour; to maximise their own payoff, Pro-
posers refrain from offers that are likely to be rejected, such as those
with which they earn disproportionately more (advantageous ineq-
uity). Indeed, Responders reject one-off proposals of 20% about half
the time, suggesting they consider it unfair to be offered dispropor-
tionately less (disadvantageous inequity; Henrich et al., 2005). This
standard format fails to capture the bidirectional property of repeated
exchanges, however, in which reciprocal tendencies are likely to sway
choices over multiple exchanges; Responders can retaliate against
prior selfishness by temporarily lowering their tolerance for disadvan-
tageous inequity, for instance, and Proposers can reciprocate with
more equitable proposals. Alternatively, either player can adopt an
unwavering strategy by offering or accepting only divisions that bene-
fit themselves maximally. An iterated UG (iUG), then, allows for vary-
ing expressions of reciprocity to unfold during a simulated real-world
dyadic interaction (Avrahami, Güth, Hertwig, Kareev, & Otsubo, 2013;
van Damme et al., 2014).
A number of neuroimaging investigations have examined brain
responses during the one-shot UG, and meta-analytic reviews reveal
that Responders' rejections are associated reliably with neural
responses in anterior insula (AI) and the dorsal anterior/anterior-mid
cingulate cortices (aMCC; Feng, Luo, & Krueger, 2015; Gabay, Radua,
Kempton, & Mehta, 2014). The aMCC is also implicated in Proposer
behaviour, with strategic proposals eliciting electrocortical responses
in frontal midline brain regions (Billeke et al., 2014; Billeke, Zamorano,
Cosmelli, & Aboitiz, 2013; Wang, Li, Li, Wei, & Li, 2016). Given its dif-
fuse connectivity profile, the AI is believed to integrate sensory, inter-
oceptive and affective processes that together comprise emotional
feeling states (Craig, 2009)—the same states likely to drive reciprocal
choices. The aMCC appears to process and integrate social informa-
tion necessary for predicting and monitoring the outcomes of deci-
sions made during interactions, particularly those influencing the
motivational state of our interaction partner(s) (Apps, Lockwood, &
Balsters, 2013; Apps, Rushworth, & Chang, 2016). In this light, brain
function within these two regions, and the degree of their functional
connectedness, is likely to drive reciprocal behaviour.
Consistent with this notion, the strength of functional connectiv-
ity among a brain network comprising the AI and ACC has been
shown to predict the tendency to reciprocate trust (Cáceda, James,
Gutman, & Kilts, 2015). Furthermore, Feng et al. (2018) report that
functional connectivity among a brain network encompassing the AI
and ACC modulate egocentric biases expressed during fairness-
related decisions, implicating this network in normative decision-
making processes that might motivate the decision to reciprocate.
Importantly, however, these studies did not investigate reciprocal
behaviour, nor the underlying patterns of effective connectivity, dur-
ing repeated exchanges between the same interactants. Bidirectional
connectivity between these brain regions is proposed to permit the
inference of others' feeling states that allow predictions of their future
behaviour (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Medford & Critchley, 2010),
and these inferences will develop over successive interactions with
the same individual. As such, coordinated interactions between the AI
and aMCC might guide reciprocal choices during an iUG between the
same players.
The present study investigated this by performing functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) on pairs of players whilst they inter-
acted with one another on an iUG, and modelling player behaviour as
reciprocal choices. The latter was achieved by adapting a model from
experimental economics, fitting each player's round-by-round behav-
iour (the proposed division or its acceptance/rejection) to an estimate
of expected utility (EU) on each exchange (Cox, Friedman, & Gjerstad,
2007). Crucially, this estimate considered not only the distribution of
payoff between players, thereby incorporating any inequity aversion,
but also the extent to which their choices reflect reciprocal reactions
to their partner's prior behaviour; if player A considers B's past behav-
iour to have been fair then they will perceive greater utility in increas-
ing B's relative payoff, but if A believes B's past behaviour to have
been unfair they will see more utility in decreasing B's payoff (positive
and negative reciprocity, respectively). Brain responses that map onto
these round-by-round estimates of EU therefore reflect utility evalua-
tions influenced by reciprocal tendencies. Given their consistent
involvement in the UG reported by meta-analyses, their purported
roles in social decision-making and their inclusion in brain networks
implicated in reciprocity, we hypothesised that the AI and aMCC of
both players would exhibit brain responses modulated by these esti-
mates of EU. Furthermore, we predicted that patterns of AI–aMCC
connectivity underlie reciprocal choices; specifically, that signals from
AI in response to the prior behaviour of an interaction partner would
serve as inputs to the aMCC, thereby modulating the response of the
latter and, in turn, the resultant behavioural output (the choice of
offer, or decision to accept/reject). This was achieved with beha-
vioural Dynamic Causal Modelling (bDCM; Rigoux & Daunizeau,
2015), a technique capable of identifying patterns of directional
(effective) connectivity within this two-node network, how this con-
nectivity profile is influenced by EU and if it can be used to estimate
choices on the iUG.
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Participants
The initial sample comprised 70 males recruited fromMasaryk University,
Czech Republic, who were paired to form 35 Proposer–Responder dyads.
The individuals comprising each dyad had never met prior to the day of
the experiment. Male–male dyads were measured exclusively to avoid
any potentially confounding factors associated with mixed-sex interac-
tions. Poor behavioural or neuroimaging data from one Proposer and one
Responder comprising two different dyads led to the omission of two
pairs (see below). The 66 males forming the remaining 33 dyads had a
mean age of 30.6 years (SD = 11.0; range = 19–65; mean intra-dyad age
difference = 2.1 years); all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision
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and no history of neurological diseases or psychiatric diagnosis. All partic-
ipants provided informed consent prior to the experimental procedure,
which was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Masaryk
University.
2.2 | Procedure
On the day of the experiment, the Proposer and Responder of a given
pair met for first time and exchanged names before being sent to one
of two scanners located in adjacent rooms. Player roles were assigned
randomly at the start of scanning but remained fixed throughout the
experiment, one participant playing the role of Proposer and the other
playing Responder on all rounds. Fixing the roles in this way allowed
players to learn about and adapt to (reciprocate) their partner's behav-
iour over a relatively short period. Prior to the experiment, players
were told explicitly that throughout the scanning procedure they
would play with the same individual to whom they had just been
introduced, and that their respective roles would remain fixed. Func-
tional scanning was conducted in a single session, comprising
60 rounds (events) of the iUG and 30 rounds of a control condition
(CTRL; see below) performed in an event-related fashion. Each UG
round began with the Proposer being given 4 s to choose between
two divisions of the pie (the ‘choice set’; see below) between them-
selves and the Responder (Choice). Only after this 4 s period was the
Proposer's offer highlighted for a further 4 s (Offer), during which the
Responder chose to accept or reject the proposal. Again, only after
this period was the Responder's decision presented for a final 4 s
(Decision). The same procedure was followed on CTRL rounds, but the
choice set comprised two alternative divisions of colour. An example
UG and CTRL round is illustrated in Figure 1. Importantly, the stimuli
comprising each round were presented simultaneously to both players
who observed the exact same stimulus sequence—Responders saw
the choice set from which Proposers selected their offer, and Pro-
posers saw the Responder's decision to accept/reject the proposal.
Players gave their choices via two-button response boxes. All rounds
ended with a jittered inter-trial interval, with a fixation cross pre-
sented for 2–4 s (mean = 3). The same pseudo-randomised inter-
mixed sequence of UG and CTRL choice sets was used for all pairs,
which was defined by a genetic algorithm for design optimisation set
to maximise contrast detection between conditions (Wager & Nichols,
2003). Participants received the monetary outcome of six UG rounds
selected randomly [mean reward = 240 CZK (approx. €9)]. Players
were never informed about the choice sets they would encounter, nor
the number of remaining rounds during the experiment (see Support-
ing Information for participant instructions).
As part of a separate ongoing study, after the iUG each player
completed two self-reports instruments measuring components of
personality—the Action Control Scale (ACS-90; (Kuhl, 1994) and Inter-
personal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). As an exploratory analysis, we
assessed whether performance on the iUG and metrics of effective
connectivity estimated by bDCM were related to personality variables
measured by these instruments. Given the exploratory, post hoc nature
of these analyses, however, we do not present the results here. Instead,
the reader can consult them in Table S4, Supporting Information.
2.3 | UG stimuli
Each of the 60 UG rounds presented players with a choice set consist-
ing of two divisions of 100 Kc (approx. €4), from which Proposers
were required to select one as their offer to the Responder. From the
Proposers' perspective, the two divisions differed in magnitude of
advantageous inequity; on 30 rounds they had to choose between
FIGURE 1 Example UG (left) and CTRL round (right), comprising 4-s Choice, Offer and Decision periods. In these examples, the offer made by
the Proposer on the UG round is rejected by the Responder, whilst the offer made on the CTRL round is accepted [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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maximal and minimal advantageous inequity (e.g., 70:30|60:40), and
for the other 30 UG rounds, they were required to choose between
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity (e.g., 60:40|40:60). For
the sake of brevity, herein we refer to the former division of each type
of choice set as the selfish division, and the latter as the generous
division. Together, these two types of choice sets were intended to
maximise expressions of reciprocity between players: For those in
which the Proposer incurred a greater relative cost by being generous,
they were more justified in offering the selfish division and, in turn,
expressed greater co-operative intent when offering the generous
division. Conversely, when the relative cost to the Proposer was mini-
mised in offering the generous division, a selfish offer (SO) indicated
less co-operative, more egoistic motives. To optimise our modelling
procedures applied to behavioural and brain data, all UG rounds were
combined. Table S1 lists the 10 choice sets used in the experiment,
which were pseudo-randomised and intermixed among CTRL rounds
(see above). Importantly, pseudo-randomisation ensured an even dis-
tribution of each choice set throughout the procedure, such that no
choice was presented twice in succession. One Responder chose to
accept all proposals, regardless of their payout. Data from this individ-
ual and their corresponding Proposer were excluded from all analyses.
2.4 | Imaging protocol
As part of a dual-fMRI protocol, functional and structural MR data
were acquired from each player comprising a dyad simultaneously
with one of two identical 3T Siemens Prisma scanners equipped with
a 64-channel bird-cage head coil. Players were allocated to one of the
two scanners in a counterbalanced fashion, ensuring an even number
of Proposers and Responders were scanned in each. Blood-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) images were acquired with a T2*-weighted
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with parallel acquisition (i-PAT;
GRAPPA acceleration factor = 2; 34 axial slices; TR/TE = 2000/35
ms; flip angle = 60; matrix = 68 × 68 × 34, 3 × 3 × 4 mm3 voxels).
Axial slices were acquired in interleaved order, each oriented parallel
to a line connecting the base of the cerebellum to the base of orbito-
frontal cortex; this permitted whole-brain coverage. Functional imag-
ing was performed in a single run comprising 690 volumes (23 min),
with four dummy volumes acquired at the beginning to allow the gra-
dients to reach steady state. A high-resolution T1-weighted structural
MR image was acquired prior to the functional run for localisation and
co-registration of the functional time series (MPRAGE, TR/TE =
2,300/2.34 md; flip angle = 8; matrix = 240 × 224 × 224, 1 mm3
voxels).
2.5 | Preprocessing
Neuroimaging data were preprocessed with SPM12 (http://www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), which involved spatial realignment and unwarping,
slice-time correction, normalisation and spatial smoothing. Motion
correction was performed using a six-parameter rigid-body transfor-
mation, with the first functional scan as a reference. Six motion
parameters estimated from this realignment processed were used sub-
sequently as nuisance covariates to account for motion-related vari-
ance. One Proposer exceeded our exclusion criterion of 2 mm of
movement in any direction between successive volumes; data from
this participant and their opponent were omitted from all subsequent
analyses. Initial attempts to normalise the functional time series to the
Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) T1 template failed for several
subjects, so we used non-linear transformations (trilinear interpola-
tion; 16 warping iterations) to co-register the mean of the motion-
corrected fMRI volumes to the EPI template in MNI space. To maxi-
mise the quality of this normalisation process, we used the mask_ex-
plorer tool (Gajdoš, Mikl, & Marecek, 2016). Images were then
smoothed with a 5-mm isotropic Gaussian kernel, and a high-pass fil-
ter with 128 s cut-off removed low-frequency drifts.
2.6 | Reciprocity model
Cox et al.'s (2007) model of reciprocity extends other distributional
preference models that consider only the final relative payoff between
players (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999); specifi-
cally, it attempts to fit the behavioural observation that choices
depend not only on the final distribution of payoff, but also on any
available alternatives. More importantly, it also considers players'
choices to be influenced by reciprocal tendencies. Unlike higher belief
equilibrium models (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher,
2006), the reciprocity model is tractable and enables the estimation of
behavioural parameters; it provides an estimate of the degree to
which a player's proposals, or their decisions to accept/reject an offer
reflects reciprocal reactions to their opponent's prior behaviour.
In our adaptation, for each player, the EU of a division of the pie
was specified as:
U x,100−xð Þ¼ x+ θ+ ϵð Þ 100−xð Þ ð1Þ
In Equation (1), x is the player's portion of a division, θ is a scalar
that represents their emotional state and ϵ is a random variable with
standard logistic distribution representing an unobserved component
of the utility function—an error term that adds stochasticity to the
player's choice behaviour (e.g., unintended responses). The emotional
state was formulated as:
θ¼ αi x−x0ð Þ ð2Þ
Equation (2) incorporates a player-specific reciprocity parameter,
α, which weighs a comparison of the player's share, x, against a fair-
ness reference point, x0, by the extent to which the player's choices
are influenced by their opponent's prior behaviour. Whilst αi is the
time invariant, the reference point, x0, is different for each choice set
and therefore changes on each round. In other words, θ > 0 on a given
round represents a player's affective response to their opponent's
prior behaviour, driven by their evaluation of fairness at that point in
the game and their overall tendency to reciprocate across the iUG.
We modelled round-by-round EU for both players based upon
this utility function; the Responder accepts a proposal if:
x+ θ+ ϵð Þ 100−xð Þ>0 ð3Þ
The Proposer offers the generous division if:
P1 x1 + θ+ ϵð Þ 100−x1ð Þð Þ>P2 x2 + θ+ ϵð Þ 100−x2ð Þð Þ ð4Þ
From the Proposer's perspective, x1 and x2 in Equation (4) repre-
sent the generous and selfish division, respectively and Pi represents
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the probability that the Responder will accept a division given their
prior behaviour. In other words, the Proposer makes a SO that bene-
fits themselves maximally only if they believe the offer is likely to be
accepted. To capture the expectation of acceptance on a given round,
our model estimated the range of preceding rounds that maximised
the log-likelihood of the Proposer model (predicted Proposers' offers
with highest accuracy). This is referred to as the memory [M] parame-
ter, which was estimated at the group level from the decisions of all
Responders. Importantly,M was estimated only for Proposers because
their payoff on a given round depends upon the expected (unknown)
decision of the Responder; conversely, the round-by-round payoff for
the Responder depends upon the Proposer's offer, which is known.
The Supporting Information details the procedures through which the
various parameters were estimated.
2.6.1 | General linear modelling
General linear modelling (GLM) was performed on the preprocessed
time series in a two-step process using SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk). First, within-subject fixed-effect analyses were used for param-
eter estimation at the individual level. Event-related responses were
modelled as the period of rounds in which a player made their choices,
with durations determined by their response time: To capture brain
responses that reflected each player's reciprocal reactions to their
partner's prior behaviour, for Proposers, we modelled the Choice
period of each round until an offer was selected, whilst for
Responders it covered the Offer period until a decision had been made
to accept or reject the proposed division (see Behaviour). Using
response times in this way served to introduce further jitter, optimis-
ing the estimation of brain responses underlying choices. The remain-
ing parts of the rounds were modelled as regressors of no interest.
These responses were then convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
response function. For UG rounds, we added parametric modulators
that expressed the round-by-round EU estimated with the reciprocity
model (UGMOD). Statistical evaluations of the first-level parameter
estimates were performed with group-level whole-brain random-
effects contrasts, with cluster-level family wise error (FWE) correction
for multiple comparisons across space. Given the wide age range of
our sample, and the observation that participant age contributes to
the degree of variability in expressions of reciprocity (Cáceda et al.,
2015), we compared these group-level estimates of EU-modulated
brain responses to the same model with age entered as an additional
group-level covariate.
2.6.2 | Behavioural DCM
DCM is a mathematical technique that models how information
enters, propagates and reverberates throughout a brain network
(Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003). In an extension of this, bDCM
attempts to fit such stimulus-induced changes in effective connectiv-
ity to behavioural outcomes—it performs a neurocognitive decomposi-
tion of the input-state-output transfer function. A detailed description
of the estimation process behind bDCM is provided in Rigoux and
Daunizeau (2015), and a description of this process as applied to our
data is given in the Supporting Information. Below, we summarise the
primary components.
In our implementation, bDCM estimated three sets of parameters:
(A) A pattern of task-independent endogenous connectivity between
the AI and aMCC, representing the directional influence(s) between
these two nodes at rest (see below); (B) task-dependent modulation of
these endogenous connections, representing their round-by-round
perturbation by estimates of EU from our reciprocity model and (C)
the direct influence of an experimental stimulus (presentation of the
choice set for Proposers, and the offer for Responders) on a network
node, modelled as an unconvolved regressor representing the Choice
(Proposer) or Offer (Responder) period before the player made their
choice. Through a combined influence of these three parameters,
bDCM then estimated a player's choices (hA). It is important to note
that, in order to optimise the modelling procedure, the behaviour of
each player was expressed as a binary function—that is, whether a
generous (1) or selfish division (0) was offered by the Proposer, and if
the offer was accepted (1) or rejected (0) by the Responder.
Parameter estimation was performed with the Variational Bayes-
ian Analysis toolbox of MATLAB (Daunizeau, Adam, & Rigoux, 2014).
In a hypothesis-driven approach, the A parameter was set according
to the meta-analytic results of Feng et al. (2015); namely, volumes of
interest (VOIs; spheres of 10 mm radius) were centred on co-
ordinates within the right AI (x = 38, y = 20, z = 0) and aMCC (x = 8,
y = 22, z = 40) that expressed the contrast fair > unfair offers maxi-
mally across 11 neuroimaging studies employing the UG. From these
VOIs, we extracted the first eigenvariate of all time series from voxels
expressing the UG > CTRL contrast in the GLM analysis (pFWE <
.001). Structural (endogenous) models of causal connectivity between
the VOIs modelled the hypothesised brain state. All neurophysiologi-
cally feasible models were evaluated with Variational Bayes
(VB) inversion, which rated the likelihood of each with log model evi-
dences. Fourteen models were evaluated, defined by logical combina-
tions of the A, B, C and hA parameters. As shown in Figure 2, the
model space comprised those with both uni- and bi-directional intrin-
sic connections between the two regions (A parameter), the modula-
tory influence of EU on either the nodes themselves or their
interconnections (B parameter), and direct stimulus input to either
node (C parameter). Logical combinations of intrinsic nodal connectiv-
ity and direct nodal input restricted the number of model compari-
sons; for example, a model with direct input to AI and a unidirectional
endogenous connection from aMCC to AI would not permit input–
output information flow through the circuit, and was therefore not
considered. Furthermore, given its purported role in translating cogni-
tive processes into action, only models where the behavioural
response is driven by aMCC were considered. After VB inversion, we
assessed the log model evidences for all models and subjects using a
random-effect Bayesian model selection (RFX BMS) procedure.
This produced approximated exceedance probabilities (AEPs) and
estimated model frequencies (EMFs), goodness-of-fit indices based
upon the free energy of all compared models that reflect how well a
given model fits both the BOLD and behavioural time series (the latter
representing the binarised choices of each player in each round). The
AEP identifies the relative superiority of one model compared to all
others comprising the model space (Penny, Stephan, Mechelli, & Fris-
ton, 2004; Stephan et al., 2007), and the model earning the highest
exceedance probability is defined as the optimal model; a value of 0.8
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indicates that the model is 80% more likely to be better than other
model given the data. The EMF provides an estimate of the preva-
lence of each tested model in the population (Rigoux, Stephan, Fris-
ton, & Daunizeau, 2014; Stephan et al., 2009). Importantly, it is not
possible to infer whether the neuroimaging or behavioural data drives
the fit indicated by the AEP or EMF. For this reason, we also com-
puted a behavioural fit precision (BFP) index, which is computed
directly from a comparison of the measured and modelled behavioural
responses—for each subject, it represents the amount of matches
between their real/observed and estimated time series divided by the
total number of responses.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Behaviour
To assess whether player choices were driven solely by monetary pay-
off, we first examined performance across the 10 different choice sets
used on UG rounds (see Figure 3a). As shown in Table 1, Spearman
correlations revealed that neither players' RTs were related signifi-
cantly to their payoff in the selfish division. To assess whether RTs
were influenced more by the degree of inequity presented by the
choice set, we calculated the difference between the log ratios of the
two divisions comprising each choice set; higher values of this
FIGURE 2 Models evaluated with Bayesian model selection. Models
comprise either a single unidirectional or bidirectional intrinsic
connections from right anterior insula (AI) to right anterior/anterior-
mid cingulate cortex (aMCC), but vary in the target of EU modulation
FIGURE 3 Player behaviour. (a) Mean frequency of selfish offers (SO)
and their acceptance (SA) for each of the 10 choice sets. Error bars
present SE. (b) Probabilities of SO and SA plotted as a logistic function
of expected utility (EU), as estimated with the reciprocity model.
(c) The proportion of SO plotted as a function of Proposers'
reciprocity (α), as estimated by the reciprocity model. This reveals that
with increasing reciprocity, Proposers were less likely to offer the
division that benefited themselves maximally. (d) Cumulative
frequencies of SOs and SAs over all 60 UG rounds, for three example
dyads. For the leftmost dyad, estimates of reciprocity were low for
both the Proposer (αP) and Responder (αR). This is reflected in high
number of SOs and SAs; the Proposer was free to offer selfish
divisions because the Responder did not challenge such proposals
with rejections (negative reciprocity). In the middle dyad, the
Responder did challenge SOs and this is reflected in a higher
reciprocity estimate. These rejections did not alter the Proposer's
behaviour, however; they continued to propose SOs, reflected in a
low reciprocity estimate. In the rightmost dyad, estimates of
reciprocity were high for both the Proposer and Responder, and this
is reflected in a low number of SOs and SAs; the Responder was
unwilling to accept selfish divisions, and the Proposer responded with
fewer selfish proposals [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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inequity coefficient represented a greater difference in inequity
between the constituent divisions (e.g., 70:30|30:70 vs. 55:45|45:55;
see Table S1, Supporting Information). Neither Proposers' nor
Responders' RTs were correlated significantly with this coefficient. It
is important to acknowledge that the lack of relationship between
Responder RTs in the Offer period and other measures of UG perfor-
mance might reflect the simultaneous presentation of stimuli to both
players; Responders may have begun to evaluate the constituent divi-
sions during the Choice period, making their RTs in the Offer period
less representative of their decision-making process. Indeed,
Responders' RTs were significantly shorter than those of Proposers
[1,268.10 (SD  491.34) vs. 2,165.64 (409.95) m; t[64] = 8.06,
p < .001, d = 1.98].
We then examined patterns of choices over the different choice
sets and proposed divisions; namely, the number of rounds on which
the selfish of the two divisions was offered (SO), and the number of
these offers that were accepted [selfish-offer acceptance (SA)]. In Pro-
posers, the number of SOs for given choice set was not correlated with
their relative payoff for the selfish division, but the number of SAs by
Responders was correlated positively with their own payoff. The num-
ber of SOs and SAs was unrelated to the inequity coefficient. Together,
these results indicate that Proposers' choices were influenced by fac-
tors other than their own monetary payoff (or cost) or the distribution
of payoff between players. Responders showed some influence of pay-
off, but the strength of this association would be stronger should their
choices be driven purely by monetary gain. This might explain why nei-
ther players' RTs tracked with the absolute or relative payoff.
Next, we applied our adapted reciprocity model to the beha-
vioural data of each player measured throughout the iUG to estimate
the degree to which each individual's choices reflected reactions to
their interaction partner's prior behaviour. For Proposers, greater
values of EU represent higher utility for the more generous division
within a choice set; whilst for Responders, it represented greater
utility in accepting a proposed division. As shown in Figure 3b, the
probability of SOs and SAs varied according to the estimates of EU
from our reciprocity model; the model correctly estimated the choices
of Proposers and Responders on 70.05 [0.01 (Log-likelihood =
−1,070.6; Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 2,207.2)] and 81.81
(0.01) % of UG rounds (Log-likelihood = −677.8; AIC = 1,421.6),
respectively. The model produced a reciprocity parameter, α, for each
Proposer and Responder, which were lower for the former (.06 [.01])
compared with the latter (.12 [.02]) than; t[38.3] = 9.61, p < .001);
Proposers' decisions reflected stronger reactions to their partner's
decisions. Interestingly, however, α estimates for Proposers were cor-
related negatively with the number of SOs they proposed (r[32] = −.84
[.73, .90] p < .001); the more reciprocity they exhibited, the less likely
they were to propose divisions that benefited themselves maximally
(see Figure 3c). No such relationship was observed between
Responders' α and SAs (ρ[17] = −.01 [−.32, .37], p = .942). Across all
Proposers, the optimal M parameter was 56. Whilst this identified the
range of preceding rounds that maximised the accuracy of estimates
for Proposers' offers, accuracy increased only subtly beyond a range
of 20 (see Table S3).
To evaluate our reciprocity model more formally, we compared it
against a variety of alternative models (see Supporting Information for
details on model specifications). First, we tested a nested model by
fixing the reciprocity parameter to α = 0 for both players—a self-
regarding model that evaluated the reciprocity parameter by testing
the assumption that both players care only about their own monetary
payoff. A likelihood ratio test (L) and AIC comparison demonstrated
that our reciprocity model outperformed this simple monetary model
for both Proposers (AIC = 2,925.1; L[33] = 811.00, p < .001) and
Responders (AIC = 1900.5; L[33] = 544.90, p < .001). We then
assessed whether player choices reflect learning processes over multi-
ple rounds rather than reciprocal reactions by modelling each player's
behavioural data with a three-parameter reinforcement learning
TABLE 1 Correlations among indices of performance over the iUG and the 10 different choice sets, for Proposers (top) and Responders (bottom)
Payoff SO Inequity SO/SA RT
Proposer Payoff SO 1
–
Inequity .46 1
[−.20,.85] –
SO −.62 .32 1
[−.97,.01] [−.39,.79] – 1
RT −.33 .47 .82** –
[−.88,.46] [−.29,.89] [.37,.97]
Responders Payoff SO 1
–
Inequity −.46 1
[−.87,.22] –
SA .66* .29 1
[−.02,.99] [−.38,.77] –
RT .40 .44 .71* 1
[−.34,.87] [−.32,.77] [.01,.99] –
RT = response time; SA = selfish offer acceptance; SO = selfish offer/division. Note. Values in square brackets present the confidence intervals computed
from 1,000 bootstraped samples. *p < .05. **p < .01 (two-tailed).
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model (Erev & Roth, 1998). This model contains a forgetting parame-
ter φ, an experimentation parameter ε, and a strength parameter
s (an extension of the simple one-parameter reinforcement learning
model, in which φ = 1 and ε = 0). Each parameter was fitted to maxi-
mise the log-likelihood function, separately for Proposers (φ = 0.91,
ε = 0.15, s = 5.6) and Responders (φ = 0.84, ε = 0.15, s = 6.00). Again,
an AIC comparison revealed that the fit of our reciprocity model sig-
nificantly outperformed this reinforcement learning model for both
Proposers (AIC = 2,492) and Responders (AIC = 1,794).
Finally, from a game theoretic perspective, our reciprocity model
might be considered inappropriate for the repeated nature of our iUG;
players might have planned their moves at the beginning of the game,
taking into account that at every stage (round) their action (choice) will
have an immediate payoff and also affect the continuation value in
the rest of the game (Mailath & Samuelson, 2006). To assess this, we
also evaluated our reciprocity model against one that modelled each
player's choices in terms of a fixed strategy over all rounds. Since the
set of possible strategies is infinite, some a priori restriction on the set
of strategies was needed. We evaluated 12 reasonable strategies that
players might have followed (see Table S2). For each player, we then
took the strategy that matched their actual choices on most rounds
(the strategy with the highest likelihood) and calculated the fit of the
overall model. A comparison revealed that this alternative model esti-
mated both player's decisions with less accuracy than our reciprocity
model: For Responders, the log-likelihood was −792.2 (AIC: −1,586.4)
and their choices deviated from the maximally fitting strategy on 15%
of rounds. Similarly, the log-likelihood of the Proposer model was
−1,128.17 (AIC: −2,282.3), and their choices deviated from their best-
fitting strategy on 32% of rounds.
3.2 | General linear modelling
Whole-brain GLM revealed diffuse clusters of BOLD signal expressing
the UGMOD > CTRL contrast in both Proposers and Responders; that
is, brain responses modulated parametrically by EU estimated with
our reciprocity model. No significant differences were observed
between player roles for this contrast, and Table 2 presents the peak
co-ordinates of all clusters for both players separately to illustrate
their similarity. These clusters encompassed lateral and medial pre-
frontal, posterior parietal and inferior occipital cortices, thalamic nuclei
and the ventral striatum (e.g., caudate nucleus). As shown in Figure 4a,
the GLM analysis revealed strong EU modulation in the meta-analytic-
defined co-ordinates of the right AI and aMCC from which BOLD sig-
nal was extracted for the bDCM analysis. No significant differences
were observed between these brain responses modulated by EU and
those modulated additionally by age, even a very lenient uncorrected
level (p < .05). This indicates no additional influence of age on EU-
modulated BOLD signal.
3.3 | Behavioural DCM
The optimal patterns of effective connectivity between the meta-
analytically defined AI and aMCC, as identified by RFX BMS, are pre-
sented in Figure 5a.
As shown in Table 3, for Proposers, both the AEP and EMF
parameters converged to reveal Model 9 as the optimal model, the
free energy of which exceeded that of the confidence intervals for the
null hypothesis (see Figure 5b). The BFP index revealed that, across all
Proposers, an average of 71.45 (9.22) % of choices matched those
estimated from the bDCM procedure—namely, whether they decided
to propose the more generous of the two divisions. This model com-
prises bidirectional connections between AI to aMCC, with round-by-
round estimates of EU modulating the aMCC-to-AI feedback connec-
tion. Through this circuit, presentation of the choice set elicits
increased BOLD response within the AI (.02 Hz), which then sends
excitatory signals to aMCC (.52 Hz). The aMCC then sends inhibitory
feedback to AI (−.38 Hz), the strength of which is modulated nega-
tively by EU (−.05 Hz); as such, the inhibitory feedback becomes
weaker (less negative) with greater EU for the more generous division.
As a result of the elevated BOLD response in aMCC, generous offers
are more likely (.11 Hz)—in other words, as a result of signal conduc-
tion through this circuit, with greater EU for the generous division,
the Proposer is more likely to make a generous offer.
For Responders, both AEP and EMF parameters revealed that
Model 2 was the winning model, and the free energy of this model
exceeded the confidence intervals for the null hypothesis (see
Figure 5b). The BFP indicated that, across all Responders, through this
model the bDCM procedure correctly estimated the decision to
accept a proposal on 84.25 (11.01) % of UG rounds. This model
again comprises bidirectional connections between AI and aMCC. Pre-
sentation of the offer elevates the BOLD response of AI (.06 Hz),
which sends excitatory signals to aMCC (.50 Hz). Then, through the
aMCC-to-AI connection, the aMCC sends inhibitory feedback signals
to AI (−.39 Hz). The elevated BOLD response in aMCC serves to
increase the likelihood of acceptance (.04 Hz), and the feedforward
AI-to-aMCC connection is modulated positively by round-by-round
estimates of EU (.01 Hz). In other words, with greater EU for the pro-
posed division, there is an increased likelihood of acceptance.
4 | DISCUSSION
This study investigated the brain processes underlying the bidirec-
tional reciprocity characterising social decision-making. To this end,
we investigated if the choices made by two interacting individuals
over recursive economic exchanges could be estimated by specific
patterns of connectivity between the right AI and aMCC. Players'
decisions on each round were modelled as EU in a way that captured
their expression of reciprocity—that is, the extent to which their
choices on each exchange reflect reactions to their opponent's prior
choices. Estimates of EU modulated the brain response of both
regions and patterns of effective connectivity between them, and this,
in turn, estimated player choices with high accuracy.
It is important to restate that, from a game theoretic perspective,
our reciprocity model might seem inappropriate for the repeated
nature of our iUG design. Since the choice set changed on each round,
however, our iUG did not involve a repetition of the same stage game.
Furthermore, the strategies employed during a repeated interaction
are likely to be highly complex, making it impossible to distinguish
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utility function parameters from them: Consider a player with a high
value for their reciprocity parameter—this player has a strong ten-
dency to punish unfair play or reward fair behaviour, but such a beha-
vioural pattern is indistinguishable from a tit-for-tat strategy. As such,
any attempt to model the behaviour as a repeated game would
require additional assumptions about possible strategies to escape the
folk theorem. By considering only players' expressions of reciprocity,
our model has reduced the complexity of strategies whilst still esti-
mating choices with high accuracy. This provides a new model for
future research.
Reciprocity emerges as an indirect chain of inter-brain processes;
through neural coupling, one individual's brain activity results in a
behavioural output, which then elicits systematic neural responses in
their interaction partner to initiate a behavioural reaction (Hasson &
Frith, 2016). We have shown that the choices of two individuals
engaged in economic exchanges fit closely with estimates of EU that
reflect their round-by-round reactions towards their interaction part-
ner. Whilst this deviates from game-theoretic assumptions that
players choose a strategy at the beginning of the game and stick with
it throughout, it fits with other observations of choice behaviour;
Johnson, Camerer, and Rymon (2002), for instance, demonstrated that
individuals engaged in a multiple-round bargaining experiment focus
on the current round when making choices rather than planning their
behaviour in advance. Brain responses that map onto these round-by-
round estimates of EU in each player therefore exhibit such neural
coupling. Given their consistent involvement in the UG (Feng et al.,
2015; Gabay et al., 2014), and in social decision-making more
generally (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011), it is perhaps unsurprising to see
such neural coupling within the AI and aMCC. What is surprising,
however, is that the reciprocal choices of both players can be esti-
mated accurately by modelling patterns of effective connectivity
between just these two brain regions. Within this simple network, the
Proposer's decision to reward themselves or their interaction partner
maximally, and the Responder's decision to accept or reject a division,
involves the propagation of excitatory neural signals from the AI to
the aMCC. The aMCC then determines the player's choice, whilst also
sending inhibitory feedback signals to the AI. In Proposers, greater
utility of the more generous division served to downregulate the feed-
back connection; with greater EU they were more likely to make a
generous offer, and this connection became less inhibitory. Since the
AI is involved in affective feeling states, an attenuation of the feed-
back connection with more generous offers (which incurs a greater
relative cost to the Proposer) might therefore reflect a greater emo-
tional reaction caused by the choice. In contrast, the positive modula-
tion of the feedforward connection from AI to aMCC in Responders
during offers with greater EU, which were more likely to be accepted,
might reflect a positive affective response that provides a motiva-
tional cause for acceptance. Future studies should utilise other corol-
lary measures of affectivity (e.g., skin conductance) to assess if and
how emotional states influence reciprocal choices on the iUG.
Tract-tracing studies in non-human primates have demonstrated
that the insula cortex is connected densely and reciprocally with not
only the anatomically defined anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), but all
association cortices, orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices,
TABLE 2 Brain regions exhibiting EU-modulated responses
Proposer Responder
Label Voxels Peak x y z Voxels Peak x y z
Frontal pole R 305 9.54 33 53 25
MFG L 36 6.66 −27 32 25
R 73 7.43 33 −1 64
IFG R 30 7.15 51 5 28
Insula/IFG* R 177 10.78 54 17 −8
Insula L 424 8.47 −39 −1 4 444 9.36 −42 −4 13
R 296 10.52 42 −4 10
Pallidum R 22 6.36 15 8 −2
Thalamus L 81 7.35 −12 −28 7
R 68 7.38 12 −19 4
Precentral gyrus L 496 8.70 −3 −13 76
Postcentral gyrus L 828 10.45 −60 −25 40
R 764 10.57 42 −37 61
IPS L 892 10.06 −54 −25 49
LOC L 633 9.87 −39 −82 −11
R 1876 10.18 27 −61 37
IOG/Fusiform gyrus L 25 5.51 −27 −91 13
R 892 9.13 30 −82 −14 202 7.61 12 −103 4
Cerebellum L 1,135 11.65 −36 −55 −32
R 41 6.75 18 −70 −47 29 6.18 48 −58 −29
MFG = middle frontal gyrus; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; IPS = intraparietal sulcus; LOC = lateral occipital cortex; IOG = inferior occipital gyrus; PCC = pos-
terior cingulate cortex. The table lists clusters of voxels expressing the UGMOD > CTRL contrast (pFEW < .001, k > 20 voxels), for both Proposers (left) and
Responders (right). Coordinates are specified in MNI space, and voxels are given at 3 mm3 resolution. *Clusters extend into VOIs used for behavioural
Dynamic Causal Modelling analyses.
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temporolimbic structures (e.g., amygdala), the thalamus, basal ganglia
and brain stem nuclei (Augustine, 1996; Mesulam & Mufson, 1982a,
1982b). Neuroimaging of the human brain demonstrates an anterior–
posterior distinction within the insula, whilst the anterior extent is
connected structurally with ACC, frontal, orbitofrontal and anterior
temporal areas, the posterior aspect possesses structural connections
with parietal and sensorimotor cortices (for a review, see Uddin,
2015). This fits with the functional anatomy of the insula cortex;
meta-analyses converge to delineate between the socio-emotional
and cognitive functions of the ventral and dorsal anterior aspect,
respectively, and the sensorimotor profile of the posterior insula
(Kelly et al., 2012; Kurth, Zilles, Fox, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010). Such
connectivity places AI in an ideal position to integrate the sensory,
cognitive and affective signals necessary for subjective feeling states
(Craig, 2009). In this way, the AI is capable of exerting strong influ-
ences on cognition; by associating stimuli with internal feeling states
it determines their relative salience and the cognitive resources allo-
cated for their processing. By extension, the AI has the capacity to
influence motivational processes; by associating stimuli with positive
or negative feeling states it encodes their incentive value, motivating
approach or avoidance behaviour (Namkung, Kim, & Sawa, 2017). Our
observation of EU-modulated brain responses in the AI, and their
influence on behavioural outputs via the aMCC, might therefore sug-
gest that the AI provides the emotional motivation behind reciprocal
choices.
The ACC also boasts an extensive and wide-reaching connectivity
profile. In addition to its connections with the insula cortex (Mufson &
Mesulam, 1982), ACC projects to and receives input from lateral and
orbital prefrontal cortex, temporolimbic structures and sensorimotor
cortices (Vogt, Pandya, & Rosene, 1987). Given this diffuse connectiv-
ity profile, the ACC is considered a brain hub through which signals of
emotional and motivational states are combined and translated into
action (Apps et al., 2016). This converges with a wealth of research
showing the engagement of ACC during cost–benefit evaluations that
influence our motivation, and drive decisions to maintain or switch
our current behaviour (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Kolling et al., 2016).
For the sake of brevity, we have referred collectivity to the aMCC.
Importantly, however, subdivisions exist within this cortical midline
area, in terms of both cytoarchitecture and connectivity profiles;
whilst both the gyrus and sulcus of the ACC connect with orbitofron-
tal cortex and the nucleus accumbens, indicating a shared processing
of reward-related information to guide decision-making, the gyrus is
connected more strongly with the superior temporal sulcus (Seltzer &
Pandya, 1989) and temporal poles (Barbas, Ghashghaei, Dom-
browski, & Rempel-Clower, 1999)—brain regions engaged during the
inference of others' mental and intentional states. Furthermore, there
is accumulating evidence from animal studies that the gyral aspect of
the ACC processes the rewards for others (Chang, Gariépy, & Platt,
2013; Haroush & Williams, 2015), whereas the sulcus seems more
sensitive to first-person reward (for a review, see Apps et al., 2013,
2016). This has led to the proposal that the gyrus of the ACC
FIGURE 4 Neuroimaging results. (a) Thresholded parametric maps for the UGMOD > CTRL contrast evaluated with general linear modelling,
showing brain responses modulated by expected utility (EU) in Proposers (blue) and Responders (orange). Crosshairs show the coordinates used
as the centre of gravity for the anterior-mid cingulate cortex (sagittal slice; x = 8, y = 22, z = 40) and right AI volumes of interest (coronal and
axial slices; x = 38, y = 20, z = 0) from which BOLD signal was extracted for behavioural Dynamic Causal Modelling (bDCM). These coordinates
were defined by the meta-analytic results of Feng et al. (2015). (b) Results of the bDCM analyses. Estimates of EU from the reciprocity model
modulated the inhibitory feedback connection in Proposers (yellow arrow); and the excitatory feedforward connection in Responders (green
arrow). Note: Parameters values represent the degree of influence on the brain circuit or behaviour (black arrows) or the strength of effective
connectivity (red arrows), expressed in hertz
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processes reward in an ‘other-oriented’ reference frame, which can be
used to estimate the motivation and, in turn, predict the behaviour of
others (Apps et al., 2016). Our aMCC node straddles both the right
sulcus and gyrus of the aMCC. In this light, it is unsurprising to see
brain responses within this region that are modulated by the per-
ceived value of rewards distributed between the self and other, and
the influence of the other's behaviour (motivation) on these
valuations.
Due to their functional coupling and dense interconnectivity
across a range of cognitive phenomena, the AI and ACC are believed
to form a network that serves to motivate appropriate responses dur-
ing social interactions. Both structures contain von Economo neurons
(Allman et al., 2011), the wide axons of which will facilitate the speed
of their integrative functions and the rapid transfer of information
between them (see Craig, 2009). Through these connections, the rep-
resentation of emotion states within AI can modulate the response-
selection and decision-making processes of ACC (Medford & Critch-
ley, 2010). Connectivity between the AI and ACC is also proposed to
permit the generation of forward models of others' feeling states,
allowing us to predict the behaviour of our interaction partners and
respond accordingly (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). Proposers must
attempt such predictions of the Responder's behaviour over the multi-
ple rounds of an iUG—in order to achieve some payout, they must
propose divisions based upon the Responder's prior reactions. We
provide evidence for the role of the AI–aMCC circuit in these predic-
tions; our modelling shows that the strength of the connection from
AI to aMCC in Responders is increased by estimates of EU from our
reciprocity model. In other words, the more utility perceived in an
offer, the stronger the connectivity between AI and aMCC and the
more likely it is that the offer is accepted. It is also suggested that the
reciprocal connectivity between these two brain regions allows for
modulation in the reverse direction; ACC can project back onto AI to
modulate the feeling state elicited by an input, and the modulated
feeling state can then be sent forward to ACC for a more appropriate
response selection (Medford & Critchley, 2010). We observed this
feedback connection in both players, but in Proposers, it was modu-
lated by round-by-round estimates of EU—that is, their valuation of a
generous division in response to the Responder's prior behaviour. This
suggests that the reciprocal decision to offer a generous division
attenuates any further affective modulation.
This study presents the first application of bDCM to elucidate the
patterns of effective connectivity behind the choices made during social
interaction. Although our results demonstrate the huge potential of this
technique to offer valuable insights into the brain connectivity behind
social decision-making, they presents only a first step in understanding
brain–behaviour relationships in interactive contexts. The complex and
non-linear nature of bidirectional reciprocity likely involves much more
elaborate and diffuse brain networks than the simple two-node circuit
we have evaluated. In addition to the AI and aMCC, existing research
into the brain connectivity associated with fairness evaluations (Feng
et al., 2018; see also Feng et al., 2016) and reciprocal choices (Cáceda
et al., 2015) has demonstrated the co-ordinated involvement of dor-
somedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the frontal pole and supe-
rior temporal sulcus during social decision-making.
This study has not considered player characteristics that might
contribute towards individual differences in reciprocal tendencies
and/or the underlying pattern of neural connectivity. For example,
although we found no influence of age on brain responses modulated
parametrically by our estimate of EU, a recent study reported that par-
ticipants' age contributed to the degree of variability in their expres-
sions of reciprocity beyond the strength of resting-state connectivity
(Cáceda et al., 2015). More recently, knowledge about an opponent's
socioeconomic status has been found to influence both behavioural
and brain responses to unfairness during the UG (Zheng et al., 2017).
Furthermore, although no direct associations have been found
between personality dimensions and expressions of reciprocity in
other forms of social exchange (Cáceda et al., 2017), they may influ-
ence an individual's affective response to an opponent's behaviour.
Indeed, our exploratory analyses suggest that an individual's capacity
for emotion regulation and their empathic expression might mediate
the decision to reciprocate positively or negatively, thereby altering
patterns of underlying brain connectivity. It has also been shown that
certain socio-cognitive processes (e.g., mentalising) are involved in the
FIGURE 5 Results of variational Bayesian analysis. (a) Model
attributes, expected model frequencies (EMFs) and approximated
exceedance probabilities (AEPs) all converge to reveal that Models
9 and 2 emerged as the optimal models for Proposers and
Responders, respectively. Model attributes are expressed as posterior
probabilities for each model (x axis) to best explain each subject
(y axis). For EMF, the dashed horizontal line shows the ‘null’ frequency
profile over all models. (b) Variational Bayesian algorithm
convergence. Free energy over VB iterations demonstrated that the
observed log evidences are better explained by the random effects
generative model than the fixed effects model or chance alone (black
and grey dashed lines, respectively) [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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decision to reciprocate against norm violations (see Feng et al., 2016),
and future research is needed to determine the potentially mediating
influence of these factors on behavioural and neural indices of reci-
procity. Finally, by examining reciprocity only among dyads of healthy
males, the generalisability of our results is limited. Future research
should investigate whether our findings extend to social interactions
between female and mixed-sex dyads.
5 | CONCLUSION
This study introduces bDCM for research into social decision-making.
Using this novel input-state-output modelling procedure, we have
shown for the first time that specific patterns of neural dynamics
between the right AI and aMCC drive decision-making during real-
world social interaction. Behaviour over a series of economic
exchanges was captured accurately by modelling choices in terms of
EU influenced by reciprocity—that is, the degree to which players' val-
uations of payoff were influenced by the prior behaviour of their
interaction partner. We then estimated player choices with over 70%
accuracy by modelling effective connectivity between just these two
brain regions. As such, our results provide evidence for the role of this
network in high-level social cognition; the AI and aMCC work in tan-
dem to guide social decisions on the basis of immediate and prior dis-
tributions of self-reward and other reward.
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